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Sartre and Marx on alienation: An analysis and comparison of their theories

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Sartre and Marx on Alienation: An Analysis and Comparison of Their Theories (84 pp.)

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This thesis analyzes both Sartre's and Marx's theories of alienation and presents a comparison of the two. It explores the question of whether alienation is, as Marx depicts it, a historical phenomenon, or whether, as Sartre claims, it has a purely ontological basis.

For both Sartre and Marx, three key issues that bear on the possibility of overcoming alienation are objectification, appropriation and the identification of the individual with the species. In deeming these impossibilities, Sartre has ontologized alienation; in foreseeing their realization in the communist society, Marx has historicized it. Thus, while there are many similarities in their analyses of alienation, their conclusions regarding the fate of alienated man are drastically different. This work attempts to identify, illuminate and evaluate the presuppositions that underlie this difference.

In both their portrayals, "unalienated man" is self-mediated man, i.e., man who chooses and creates himself (as being) through his interaction with the world. Sartre is faulted for dismissing the very real potential man has for a certain degree of "self-mediation"; Marx is similarly faulted for a naive hope that man can exist as "self-caused".

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

In commenting on what he perceives to be the incompatability of Sartre's existentialism with Marxism, Raymond Aaron states: "[R]evolution will not solve an existentialist's philosophical problem, that of the dialogue of the individual with the absence of God".[1] Upon first glance, Aaron seems to be right: the Sartre of Being and Nothingness recognizes both the death of God and the freedom and responsibility that befalls man due to this loss, but he cannot reconcile man to this loss. In the absence of God, man becomes the project to be God, a hopelessly futile enterprise. Marx, on the other hand, revels in the deity's downfall; the absence of God is not a problem but a thorough liberation prompting man to take back from God his own potential for achievement which Marx believed would culminate in atheistic communist society. How, then, can Marxist revolution appease the God haunted man of Being and Nothingness?

The answer, of course, is for Marxist man to become God, or, in Sartrean terms, to attain the being of the "in-itself-for-itself". In the following, I argue that this is precisely what Marx expects communist man to attain.[2]

If, in fact, the Marxist state were possible, the existentialist's philosophical problem would be solved.

But upon closer examination, it becomes apparent that the "existentialist's philosophical problem", his "dialogue with the absence of God" is simply an expression of his alienation: his solitude, his unjustifiability and his groundlessness. To solve the existentialist's philosophical problem would be to lay the groundwork for the overcoming of alienation. It is just this groundwork Marx claims to have laid. Thus the identification of the for-itself-in-itself with communist man has far reaching implications. In denying that such a being can come about, Sartre has left man permanently alienated; the individual becomes an isolated entity unable to commune satisfactorily with either his world or his fellow man. In claiming that Communist man will prevail, Marx has characterized alienation as a historical phenomenon resulting from particular alterable circumstances. The question that bears addressing is this: Has Sartre ontologized a historical situation, or has Marx historicized an ontological situation?

A comparison of Sartre's views on alienation with those of Marx, if not fully answering the question, delineates the issues involved in answering it. This thesis presents a delineation and discussion of such issues.[3]

2.0 SARTRE: MAN AS ALIENATED

Before laying out the specifics of Sartre's theory, a brief comment on "alienation" is in order. To say that man is alienated, is to imply that he is estranged from some "x"; alienation is a relation, but a peculiar one, in that it implies a lack of relation (or as with Marx, a lack of peceived relation) between two things. But when either Marx or Sartre refer to "alienated man", they are referring to a total alienation: the alienation of man from himself, from his world, and from his fellow man. Any reference to alienated man is, therefore, a reference to man alienated in his totality.

Sartre, in Being and Nothingness, does not refer to man as alienated until he begins his discussion of "the Other". His depiction of man even prior to that discussion, however, is of a thoroughly alienated being. To avoid confusion between the former and the latter, it is helpful to make a distinction between "man as alienated", Sartre's characterization of man as estranged prior to the emergence of the other, and "alienated man", man as doubly alienated, i.e., as estranged from his "natural" but already alienated condition. This chapter deals only with "man as alienated".

Man is, according to Sartre, a "lack", a being who "secretes a nothingness which isolates [him]".[4] Man, in his very being, is a "disengagement". In bringing nothingness into the world, man also brings alienation.

This grim picture of human reality is the inevitable outcome of Sartre's ontology which posits a radical distinction between the for-itself; human consciousness, and the in-itself, all that is other than human consciousness, the things of the world. Sartre's characterization of being-in-itself is similar to Parmenides' description of being in that being is self-identical and full.[5] It is neither necessary nor contingent; it "is-itself", "being is in-itself", "being is, what it is".[6] The in-itself has no relation to itself, it is a plentitude which exists not for itself but only for a consciousness.

The for-itself arises from the in-itself as the negation of the in-itself. [7]The being of consciousness is "in-itself in order to nihilate itself in for-itself...it is, in order to lose itself in a for-itself".[8] The being of consciousness is not located outside being but arises from it as a being who exists but "whose being is to be its own nothingness".[9] The for-itself exists as the "sacrificial act" whose existence is caught up in the

nihilation of being.[10] The for-itself, being that which being is not, i.e., the nihilation of being, is a nothingness.

Thus Sartre's schism is not only a dualism, but an opposition. The two types, or "faces" of being, exist as the antitheses of one another, and as such, define one another. They are, in this sense, "internally related", but only through a negative internal bond. They define each other not in terms of a positive identification between the two, but via a negative identification. The identity of each is established over and against the other's. The for-itself is for-itself by virtue of not being in-itself, and the in-itself is in-itself by virtue of not being the for-itself. It is this negative internal bond that will characterize all of man's relations - to himself, to his world and to "the Other".

Sartre, however, in wanting to present a <u>phenomenological</u> ontology, wishes to verify his ontology phenomenologically, that is, give evidence from lived experience of the for-itself as a nothingness. He begins by examining our "fundamental" attitude toward being.

According to Sartre, man "stands before being in an attitude of interrogation".[11] Man's relation to being is that of the questioner to the questioned. What is significant about the question, for Sartre, is that it presupposes the permanent possibility of a negative reply. The question actually involves a double negation: 1) In order to interrogate the questioned, the questioner effects a nihilating withdrawal from the questioned to "bring out of himself the possibility of a non-being".[12] 2) The questioner nihilates the questioned - suspends its being "between being and non-being" in awaiting its response.[13] Either "x" is the case or "x" is not the case, and the question, by its very nature, encompasses both possibilities, being and non-being.

To give further evidence of this ontologically potent "nothingness" smuggled into the world through the for-itself, Sartre points to a number of other "negatites" which themselves are manifestations of the nothingness of human reality.[14] The experience of such things as distance, absence and destruction are fraught with "non-being"; they all presuppose the negating power of consciousness. These and other "negatites" involve a gestalt of being and nothingness, with each alternately serving as foreground and background. For example, the notion of destruction implies a nihilation of the existing

state in favor of a "remembered" previous state, which is in turn nihilated in grasping the actually existing reality. It is this shift in focus from being to non-being and back again that accounts for our experience of distance and other "negatites".

Sartre points to these and other experiences in claiming that nothingness is a component of the real. He argues that we encounter nothingness, and that, rather than it being the result of our negative judgement, it is that which conditions our negative judgments. The world then is dotted with "flickering[s] of nothingness" which the for-itself discovers.[15]

Since Sartre has defined being as a plentitude, a fullness which will not allow the "tiniest crack through which nothingness might slip in", the non-being encountered must be supplied by the for-itself.[16] Because "lack can come into being only through lack...[and] the in-itself cannot be the occasion of lack", the for-itself is identified as the "lack".[17] The for-itself, the "being through which nothingness comes into the world", is itself a nothingness.[18] In emptying out human reality, Sartre has left the for-itself a mere witness to being. It does not partake in being, but remains a flight from being, a disengagement whose "flight" reveals being. Although

consciousness is inevitably a consciousness of something, and therefore a consciousness of the in-itself, it remains perpetually "unclogged" and lucid, gaining priveleged knowledge of the in-itself.

But the for-itself is not only a pure "presence" to being, it is also condemned to be pure presence to itself. The nothingness which separates us, disengages us from being, is also that which prevents the for-itself from coinciding with itself - the for-itself is an escape even from itself. This escape, according to Sartre, takes place via the temporalization of the self.

Sartre predicates temporality to the for-itself by claiming that we "exist" the three temporal dimensions simultaneously. We are at once our past, future and present. We are our past "in the mode of not being it"; that is, we are our past to the extent that past deeds and situations, the dead facticity of what has been must be claimed by us.[19] It is this past which allows us our "identity"; we are an American, a banker, a mother, a teacher but only to the extent that we have been all of these. But we are not simply our past. We are, at any moment, a flight, a ripping away from our past toward our future. We cannot identify ourselves with out past because we are witness to it, inevitably torn from it the moment it

is posited as "past".

We are simultaneously our present, which Sartre describes as "presence of the for-itself to being-in-itself".[20] But, since this "presence" always involves a "disengagement from", it is again a mere witnessing to all that is present. The present, then, is the presence to our past, the in-itself of the temporal dimension, as well as presence to all that of which we are conscious at any given moment. The present as presence is a "flight" from being.

We are also our future as that which we are "not-yet".[21] The future is the realm of possibility which the for-itself flees toward. Sartre claims that we are constituted by our possibilities, that is, we "live" our possibilities. I am my project. It is my project, i.e., that which I intend to do or become, that shapes me. It is that which structures my world and guides my activity. "The future is revealed to the for-itself as that which the for-itself is not yet..." [22]

But I project myself into the future only to find it perpetually receding before me. A "future" day that has arrived in the present loses its character as future; future qua future, therefore, never arrives, but must exist as anticipation. It is an anticipation, however, that

shapes me and gives my present meaning.

Thus the human being as temporal being is an escape from the past into an unrealizable future. He is a sustained flight to nowhere leaving a trail of dead in-itself behind him. He is a mere presence to himself and to his world, a nothingness fleeing the in-itself.

Sartre equates this flight, this disengagement, i.e., man's alienation from being and self, with freedom: The for-itself is that being "who can realize a nihilating rupture with the world and with himself...and the permanent possibility of this rupture is the same as freedom".[23] My consciousness throws me outside the causal order. The in-itself can never be said to be the cause of my action, it is always I who chooses to act as I act. I transcend the in-itself toward my projects, and in doing so confer meaning upon the in-Itself. The in-itself has no "ready-made", pre-established meaning of its own and therefore cannot move me toward any particular action unless I, in pursuing my project, deem that such an action is warranted. The in-itself, then, becomes significant only in the light of my project, and my project, which itself can be transcended and evaluated, is freely chosen.

But there are several quirks in all of this. The for-itself, even though "disengaged", is far from being disinterested. It "grasps itself as an incomplete being", but is displeased about its being as "lack".[24] Consequently, the for-itself is not simply a flight from being; it is also a desire for and a pursuit of being. It is a "pursued-pursuing", an escape from that which would nihilate its freedom toward that which would ground it.[25] It escapes being merely to pursue it.

Thus the for-itself is both a flight and a project. It escapes the in-itself merely to project itself toward a situation that would effect its totality, that would allow it the being of the "in-itself- for-itself". But before discussing this all important but impossible being, it is necessary to clarify what Sartre means by "the project".

Sartre distinguishes between two types of project: primary and secondary. Secondary projects are those goals or ends which we freely choose to attempt to bring into being. These projects are syntheses of being and nothingness. The for-itself in order to "pro-ject" itself nihilates the givens of the present situation in favor of a projected or imagined situation the for-itself wishes to bring about. An individual nihilates "x", first in his imagination, and if he is successful, later in reality, in

favor of some "y". Any activity, mundane or otherwise, such as sewing a shirt, washing a car, raising a child, building a house, becoming a lawyer, etc., can be characterized as a secondary project.

The primary or fundamental project (there is only one) is "the quest for being".[26] This "veritable irreducible", this project to capture or aquire being, is the overriding end toward which all secondary projects aim.[27] It is, therefore, the transcendent meaning behind all acts - whatever I do, I do in order to lay claim to being.

This laying claim to being, however, is not a straightforward affair. The for-itself does not want to become in-itself, for that would be to surpass itself toward the nihilation of itself as consciousness, and "it does not want to lose itself in the in-itself of identity".[28] But it is unhappy with its status as nothingness and wishes to substantiate itself. It desires, therefore, to attain the "impossible synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself; it would be its own foundation not as nothingness but as being and would preserve within it the necessary translucency of consciousness along with the coincidence with itself of being-in-itself". [29] The for-itself, then, arises as the desire to be the "in-itself- for-itself".

This synthesis, however, involves more than the mere "mingling" of in-itself with for-itself, or even the incarnation of the for-itself as in-itself. The in-itself-for-itself, the being of God, requires that a certain relationship exist between the for-itself and in-itself. According to Sartre, we want to be the "in-itself which would be to itself its own foundation".[30] That is, we, as for-itself, wish to found ourselves as in-itself.

Thus far we have established that the in-itself-for-itself project that defines man translates to the desire to be the foundation of the in-itself. This, in turn, needs "decoding".

In order for "x" to found "y", "x" must stand at the source of "y"'s being; "x" chooses to bring "y" into being. The self seeks such a "foundation" because it appreheands itself "as not being its own foundation."[31] Sartre argues that this revelation is at the very heart of consciousness, and he goes so far as to redefine the cogito in these terms:

> ..this apprehension of being as a lack of being in the face of being is first a comprehension on the part of the cogito of its own contingency. I think, therefore I am. What am I? A being which is not its own foundation, which qua being, could be other than it is to the extent that it does not account for its being.[32]

Thus it is myself as contingent, as unfounded, as existing as an absurd given and a flight that sets the for-itself on its mission to found itself. The for-itself is a "flight ahead toward itself as self cause".[33] The for-itself wants to substantiate itself, not by embracing its absurd facticity, i.e., all that it is without having chosen it, but by rejecting it and attempting instead to become that impossible being - that being "which would be to its facticity in the same relation as the for-itself is to its motivations", the being who would choose his own facticity.[34]

But the for-itself is more than the project to found its own being qua being, i.e., its own facticity. It is the project to found the entire world. According to Sartre, the for-itself apprehends "the total world as that which is lacking to the for-itself in order that it may become in-itself-for-itself."[35] Nothing short of the entire world would render the for-itself the "totalized totality" which it inevitably seeks.[36] Therefore, the for-itself

> corresponds to an attempt on the part of being to remove contingency from its being. But this attempt results in the nihilation of the in-itself, because the in-itself cannot found itself without introducing the self or a reflective, nihilating reference into the absolute identify of its being and consequently degenerating into for-itself.[37]

Sartre, here, has created what might be called the myth of the for-itself. The for-itself arises from the being of the in-itself as an ontological mutant. The dumb and paralyzed in-itself has sent it on a mission - to found its (the for-itself's) being, with instructions not to return until the mission has been accomplished. The mission, however, is an impossible one and the for-itself can be to the in-itself only its witness, and never its foundation. The two then exist this impoverished and frustrating relation - they are condemned to exist forever apart.

Thus it is not only its own existence the for-itself wishes to save from contingency, but it is also the "choice of founding the being which it encounters. This means that the for-itself as an individual enterprise is a choice of this world as an individual totality of being...."[38]

Man's choice of himself as a nothingness, that which allows him to give meaning to his situation and to his world is not enough to satisfy him. He seeks a more substantial existence. The for-itself, then, wants to exist as an in-itself that the for-itself has chosen and brought about. The in-itself-for-itself is a being who is in total control of himself and his world and therefore might be equated with man's fundamental desire for both understanding and control.

Sartre's claim is that the being of the in-itself-for-itself perpetually haunts man as something he is not, and as such defines him:

> In the human world, the incomplete being which is released to intuition as lacking is constituted in its being by the lacked - that is by what it is not. It is the full moon which confers on the crescent moon its being as crescent. what is not determines what-is.[39]

But alas, man's fundamental project is a failure. God must be nothingness (in order for him to be a consciousness and therefore a freedom); yet He must exist substantially, as the in-itself. The desire to be God involves the unity of the fundamentally "incompatable characteristics of the in-itself and the for-itself".[40] Sartre has left man a "useless passion".[41]

Man's alienation, because he exists as both lack of being and project to capture being, is two-fold. His lack establishes him as mere presence to being; his interaction with being is futile. He remains bound to being only through an internal negation, only as consciousness of it. His project toward being, on the other hand, "alienates" him from his "lack", i.e., from his already alienated but "real" being. Man's nature is such that in trying to substantiate and found his being, in trying "to be", he merely further alienates himself. He exists not only as a refusal to be but as an attempted refusal of that refusal. If, in fact,

there were an "evil genius", as postulated by Descartes in his methodic doubt, he could not have created a more absurd being than the for-itself.

Thus far, we have given a brief overview of Sartre's ontology, and have shown that the project of the in-itself-for-itself is an impossible one. But let us temporarily disregard Sartre's ontological argument "disproving"" the possibility of the in-itself-for-itself (that argument which states that there cannot be a being who is simultaneously nothingness and plentitude) and examine the other grounds Sartre gives for dismissing the possibility of attaining that being which would see the integration of man and world. Examining these issues will give us the "meat" of Sartre's views which we will later juxtapose to Marx's views. But first, a brief summary of Marx's conception of man and his theory of alienation.

3.0 MARX'S THEORY OF ALIENATION

Marx broke with the Western philosophic tradition that had identified man as the "thinking being", locating man's essence in his capacity to reason. Man, according to Marx, is "homo faber", man the maker. What is unique in man is not merely his ability to reason, but, according to Marx, it is his "conscious life-activity" which "directly distinguishes man from animal".[42] In effect, Marx focuses on the character of man's activity rather than on the character of his mind in defining his "essential" and distinguishing attribute. Man differs from other animals in that his activity is self-conscious activity: "Man makes his life-activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness.".[43] Man is conceived as not merely a thinker, but a maker whose projects are directed and conceived in thought. But it is his nature to contemplate the world only in so far as he intends to engage himself in it. His consciousness is only a "theoretical" duplication of what is and what he hopes to bring about through his interactions with the world. Man is primarily a needy "suffering" creature whose rational capacities aim at the fulfillment of those needs.

But Marx's characterization of "need" is more than a description of basic animal drives, though it includes them as well. And although Marx does not discuss his conception of need at length, he does make a number of distinctions and qualifications.

First, he distinguishes between "natural need" and "human" or "species" need, the former being those we have in common with the animals and the latter being unique expressions of our humanness. Marx contends that we not only have needs that animals do not (such as the need to produce and create, even when our "natural" needs have been met), but that natural needs, i.e., eating, procreating, etc., take on a uniquely human character under the right circumstances. Second, for every need there is a corresponding "power" which seeks expression via the need. Man is, in this sense, empowered; he posesses innate abilities that can be expressed and developed in fulfilling his needs. In eating, for example, I am satisfying my hunger and exercising my consumptive powers. Every satisfaction involves both an "appropriation" of the object, and an exercise of powers.

"Appropriation" here is a key term, and as we shall see, one of the key issues which bears upon the possibility of overcoming alienation. According to Ollman,

"'appropriation' is Marx's most general expression for the fact that man incorporates the nature he comes into contact with into himself."[44] Man, in fulfilling his needs, appropriates the nature he interacts with.

Since Marx has defined productive activity as man's "life activity" , this need to produce (which itself serves other needs) bears close examination.[45] According to Marx, labor serves to "objectify" itself and the individual laboring: "Labor's realization is its objectification". [46] In effect, labor manifests itself in the product of labor, for labor's product is "labor which has been embodied in an object".[47] Elsewhere, Marx refers to labor as man's duplication of himself: "The object of labor is...the objectification of man's species life: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality".[48]

Marx's use of "objectification" here seem fairly straightforward. Man's powers, which themselves are not objects, express themselves objectively through the objects they have produced or created. These powers are simply the measure of man; in their interaction with the world, they express what and who he is. Thus, the creation of objects is really the creation of the self - man's powers combine with the world to express his powers, and, thereby, himself.

They are concrete manifestations of the being of man. This drive to create "a world of objects" is that which establishes man as "homo-faber".[49]

Given this characterization of human nature, it is inevitable that Marx's analysis of alienation is centered around both the laboring process and the object of production. If productive activity is "the activity by which man becomes himself", i.e., develops and expresses his powers, then it is essential that this activity takes place in accordance with man's nature.[50] As we have stated, man's "species character" is his capacity to engage in "free conscious activity". When man's productive activity cannot be characterised as such, he is deprived the means of "self-creation" and alienation abounds. The following is a very brief summary of the various forms of alienation that arise from the state of production found in a capitalist system:

3.1 Alienation Of Man From His Productive Activity

In a capitalist society, man loses the freedom to direct and control his own productive activity. His interactions with the world are no longer "conscious and free", but coerced. The worker, if he wishes to avoid

starvation, must sell his labor for a wage which, in turn, becomes the means of his subsistence. Because of the existence of "private property" in a capitalist society, (i.e., because the means of production are privately owned) the worker is unable to sustain himself in any other way; the world and all its "stuff", that which man "lives on", belong to another - the capitalist.[51] The worker labors not for himself but for the capitalist. His laboring capacities, because he owns nothing to work upon, nor any tools to work with, have become useless to him unless he can market them. Consequently, labor "produces not only commodities: it produces itself and the worker as a commodity..."[52] In order to survive, man sells his labor as a "thing"; labor becomes "an object, an external existence...it exists outside him, independently as something alien to him...it becomes a power on its own confronting him".[53]

The effects of rending labor from man are devastating: "...in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind."[54] Man, deprived of free productive activity, (of, as Ollman puts it, the "effective medium between the individual and the outer world") loses touch with his own "essence".[55] He is told what to do,

when and how to do it. Any failure on his part to respond to these demands can cost him his wage, his only means of subsistence. The objectification which does result from his productive activity is distored.[56] According to Marx, in capitalist labor, "the human being objectifies himself inhumanly".[57]

3.2 Man's Alienation From His Product:

In capitalism, man's alienation from his product takes several forms. First, since the worker has no say over the specifics of production, i.e.,the "what" "when" and "how" of the actual production process, the product which is simply the "summary of the activity of production" confronts him as an "alien object".[58] The product takes on the same alien character as does labor. According to Marx, the product of an alien process can only itself exist as alien, "as outside" of the worker. What is interesting here, for our purposes, is not that Marx sees the product as "outside" the worker but that he sees the possibility of the worker and his product as constituting a unified whole. This point will be developed and explored later.

Second, the more obvious estrangement man experiences from his product results from the fact that man does not own what he produces. The worker, despite whatever need he may have for that which he produces, is denied access to it. Nor does he have any say over what becomes of it. Man and his product are but "two ships passing in the night" - their interaction brief and meaningless, their relationship a matter of chance and not choice. The worker "spends himself" on an object which is taken from him.

But neither does the capitalist have complete control over the product. While it is his capital, ambition and greed which initiate and sustain the whole capitalist enterprise, the market dictates the "whats" and "hows" of production. As Ollman points out, the relationship of man to nature becomes a displaced relationship: "Whereas man, being a man, has the power to control nature, through excercising this power, his product is now in a position to control him". [59] The worker, deprived of his free productive activity, takes on the character of an inert thing, and the product, infused with the magic of capitalism, reigns over men.

3.3 Man's Alienation From Man

According to Marx, man's conflict with man does not arise as the consequence of some inherently flawed nature, but from the antagonisms that inevitably accompany capitalist production. These antagonisms are pervasive and exist between classes as well as between members within each class.

The class conflict between the capitalist and worker is, of course, the most obvious and immediate conflict. If the worker is estranged from the object of production, it is because "someone else is master of this object, someone who is alien, hostile, powerful, and independent of him..."[60] The capitalist, in all his greed, steals the worker's product and his life. It is he who has robbed the worker of his world and who at least appears to be directly responsible for the worker's impoverished existence. The capitalist keeps wages as low as possible in order to maximize profit. The worker's poverty is that which makes the capitalist rich.

Antagonism between individuals within a class takes the form of competition. The capitalists, of course, compete with other capitalists for markets. The worker competes with other workers for jobs, for housing and for whatever scarce resources he can find. One man's gain, at any level

of the social order, represents another man's loss.

Also, the link that exists between workers in the production process is obscured. The worker doesn't feel he is working with others in the creation of a product, but sees himself in isolation, working only for a wage. This obscuring of actually existing relations gives rise to "egoistic man", man who sees himself as "self-sufficent" and unrelated to the rest of society.[61] He does not experience himself as "in community"; he is an individual pitted against other individuals who represent a threat to his well-being.

3.4 Man's Alienation From His Species

"Man's alienation from his species" subsumes, to an extent, the other three categories of alienation mentioned above. It is an expression of the alienation of man's own nature that results from his alienations from his productive activity, his product and his fellow man. To say that man is alienated from his species means that his existence is less than human, that "the unique configuration of relations which distinguishes the individual as a human being has been transformed into something quite different...".[62] The overcoming of man's alienation from his species, then, will

inevitably involve the overcoming of the types of alienation mentioned above. "Species man" is unalienated man.

4.0 COMMUNIST MAN

Thus far we have defined the "species being" of communist man only negatively, in terms of the overcoming of man's alienation outlined above. But before an identification between communist man and Sartre's in-itself-for-itself can be made, it is necessary to take a closer look at what Marx means by the positive transcendence of alienation.

According to Marx, the communist state will bring about "the complete return of man to himself".[63] This return of man to himself, equated with the "genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man", is brought about by the "positive transcendence of private property".[64] This means that private property "persists as the relationship of the community to the world of things".[65] In effect, the entire world becomes available to all men, not for their exclusive use, but for their common use. "Life activity" which under capitalism "stands in the service of private property" will now be served by communal property.[66] That is, property becomes valuable and available as it serves human appropriation and objectification. The world is restored to the species, the product is restored to the individual, and the human essence is restored to man. The world is once again freed for man's

appropriation of it - he can sustain and express himself in it.

This is a very brief and cursory description of the basic transformation Marx believed would be respsonsible for the metamorphosis of capitalist society into communist society. For our purposes, however, it is not necessary to give a more detailed account of the specifics (i.e., the economic and political changes) involved in such a transformation. We are more interested in how this transformation will be instrumental in overcoming alienation. The following are three basic results Marx claims will be realized via this transformation:

1. Man's product will be the objectification of himself. This means that in his productive activity man will produce his real or "species being". In contrast to the distorted objectification that takes place in capitalist society, communist man will not lose himself in his object but will find or create himself in it.

The central difference between capitalist and communist "objectification" lies in the fact that the latter is a "free" project while the former is not. Because the individual is no longer forced to sell his labor to the capitalist in exchange for a wage, and because his basic needs will already be met (advanced communism comes about

only after the problem of scarcity has been solved and the redistribution of wealth completed), he is left with ample time, energy and resources to pursue the activities of his choice.[67] In the absence of restrictions placed upon the individual by the capitalist system and animal necessity, "each man deposits part of his personality, the distinctive contribution of his powers, in all he does".[68] Productive activity, for the most part, becomes creative activity; an individual's product would spring from his own inner resources, talents and inclinations, not from the dictates of the market.[69] Therefore, his product, be it a hand crafted piece of furniture, a painting, etc., becomes a powerful expression of who and what he is; it is a far richer "objectification" than the automobile or the box of Oreos fresh off the assembly line. In communist production, there is a much greater opportunity for the individual as individual to express his unique talents and sensibilities than in the capitalist system. Instead of stunting and masking the individual, communist production, because it occurs "freely", develops and reveals him.[70]

But it is not only individual men whose being will be objectified, but the being of man as a species. The "human world", the world transformed by man serves as the objectification of the being of man, as evidence of his powers and his development. Thus the individual, in

objetifying himself as an individual species being, contributes to the objectification of the species.

2. The character of man's appropriation will become fully human. This amounts to a qualitative change in man's interaction with the world which allows him to incorporate the being of nature into his own being. According to Marx, "the transcendence of private property is therefore the complete emancipation of all... senses...[71]

> Each of his human relations to the world - seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, observing, experiencing, wanting, acting loving, in short all of his individual being...are in their orientation to the object, the appropriation of that object.[72]

This revolution in human sensibility would enable man to appropriate nature upon immediate contact with it.

This is not to say that "appropriation", in some form, does not occur in capitalist society - it does. But it is a weak and incomplete appropriation. Marx depicts capitalist man, according to Meszaros, as "confin[ing] his attention to the sphere of mere utility...Objects that confront the isolated individual appear to him with their utilitarian sides only..."[73] "Human" enjoyment, however, implies a far fuller and richer appropriation of the world. As Marx points out: "It is obvious that the human eye gratifies itself in a way different from the crude non-human eye; the human ear different from the crude ear, etc."[74] That is,

refined human senses have an alltogether different grasp on the world than do those conditioned by the narrow concerns of a capitalistic society. Thus, according to Ollman, for communist man to "capture" a sunset, "it is not necessary to paint, write or sing about it. It becomes [his] in the experiencing of it".[75]

"Human" appropriation, then, can be equated with the appropriation that takes place via highly developed senses. Communist man, liberated from the constraints of capitalist production and the struggle for survival is free to develop his powers, including his senses, to capacity. In communist society, man's appropriation will be moved "toward the ends inherent in his powers..."[76] Marx's hope was that with the coming of communism,

> the richness of subjective human sensibility (a musical ear, an eye for beauty of form - in short, senses capable of human gratification, senses confirming themselves as essential powers of man) [would be] either cultivated or brought into being.[77]

Then and only then will man's powers allow for a full and "human" appropriation of the world.

3. The individual will undergo a "conceptual revolution" which, as Ollman puts it, will involve the individual "supply[ing] himself with a new subject, the community, for all but his most personal activities".[78]

The individual, while not losing his status as individual, will come to know himself as an "individual species being" who acts and lives for, with and through the species.

This identification of the individual with his species will again, be the outcome of the "positive transcendence" of private property. It is in grasping the social character of the object that man awakens to his own social nature; the individual labors for and with others and they for and with him.[79] While the natural relationships and interdependencies ivolved in the production of an object were present in capitalist production, they were obscured by the existence of private property. The individual labored, as mentioned above, only for a wage, for money; because he did not own his product and had no say over it, his product served to estrange him from rather than bind him to others. The capitalist, via the product, stole the worker's life from him. In advanced communism, however, the world (this includes man's product) is available for communal appropriation. What is acted upon is not private property, but a shared world. Any creation or production on the part of an individual is an alteration or transformation, not of a privately owned domain, but of a social world. In this sense, all men create one object - the world - for one subject - the community. As Marx puts it, it is only in communist society that "nature exists for him [the

individual] as a bond with man". [80]

This "coneptual revolution", brought about by a heightened awareness of interdependeny and mutuality in the actual production process, is the demise of the privatized, egoistic individual. The illusory "self-sufficiency" of capitalist man is replaced by "species being". The individual is no longer viewed "in abstraction from its relationships with society", but understands himself as an integral part as well as a reflection of the society.[81] Thus individual accomplishments lose their egoistic character; any particular achievement is a credit to both the individual and the society that has nurtured him and allowed for his development. According to Marx, "Man is in the most literal sense of the word a <u>zoon politikon</u>, not only a social animal, but an animal which can develop into an individual only in society."[82] Society is the mediator between the individual and his achievements; it is that which allows for the expression of his individuality, not that which precludes it.

Ollman, in pointing to the inevitable dependence any individual has on his society, gives the following example:

> A scientist who spends his lifetime in a laboratory may delude himself that he is a modern version of Robinson Crusoe, but the material of his activity and the apparatus and skills with which he operates are social products...The very language in which a scientist thinks has been

learned in a particular society.[83]

Any activity, then, whether performed with a multitiude of others or in solitude, is "social" activity, and all skills are "social" skills. An individual does not develop in isolation.

Again, it is not that such reciprocal relations do not exist in a capitalist system - they do; as described above, the relations are obscured and the individual believes himself an isolated atomized entity. In a communist society, however, these relations are emphasized, and it is then that "competition as we know it [will give] way to cooperation as we have still to learn about it".[84] Individual ends and social ends will be alligned.

5.0 COMMUNIST MAN AS THE IN-ITSELF-FOR-ITSELF: UNION OF MAN AND WORLD

As we have shown in our discussion of Sartre, the being of the in-itself-for-itself, that being which haunts man as that which he is not, can be expressed in several ways. The first (and this is the one we are temporarily suspending) is the synthesis of nothingness (for-itself) with plentitude (in-itself). When viewed in this light, the in-itself-for-itself becomes the impossible being because it is an attempt to unite within one entity incompatible characteristics or modes of being. The second expression, and the one we will be concerned with, is the in-itself-for-itself as the being who is its own foundation. We have said that this is a being who chooses itself not "as a nothingness", as with Sartre's for-itself, but as in-itself, as that which is substantial and objective. This is precisely what communist man does - he chooses himself, founds himself as being.

As Sartre noted, this being, in order to enter into a founding relationship with itself, must exist at a distance from itself. This "existence" at a distance, for Marx, is accomplished in two ways.

First, it comes about via the productive process. Marx has defined man's essence as his "free productive activity", but as we have seen, what man creates in the process is himself objectified. Through this process, man becomes nature; he is naturalized not only because in freely producing he is fulfilling his natural essence, but also because he has imprinted himself upon nature. He exists, then, at a distance from the object, but, at the same time, he "becomes the object".[85] Man is affirmed by his creation without which he would not be who he is.

In addition to this, we have seen in the previous chapter that communist man objectifies and thus chooses himself freely. He stands at the source of himself, and chooses himself in the creation of his product.

Second, man's appetancy for existing at a distance from himself is also satisfied through man's "appropriation" of the world. As we have described above, communism brings about a radical transformation of the senses. The "human senses" are those "affirming themselves as essential powers of man"- powers of appropriation.[86] And since "appropriation" at this advanced stage is the means by which man incorporates the being of nature into himself, it is another way man "becomes nature". But Marx's appropriation is not a consumption. Man appropriates nature while leaving

it intact - it is, for the most part, a nondestructive appropriation. For example, the "human eye" appropriates the world, without depleting it. It incorporates the world into itself, yet exists distanced from it. Communist man, then, not only sees himself in the world he has freely created, but feels the world in himself. The distance between subject and object has been bridged.

6.0 COMMUNIST MAN AS THE IN-ITSELF-FOR-ITSELF: THE INDIVIDUAL'S IDENTIFICATION WITH THE SPECIES

An individual's identification with his species accomplishes a number of things: First, it puts individuals "on the same side as one another", i.e., individuals are no longer in conflict, working against each other, but working for and with one another for the good of the species.

Second and more important for our analysis, this identification brings about a heightened sense of autonomy - a unique sense of "self-creation". According to Marx,

> A being only considers himself independent when he stands on his own feet; and he stands on his own feet when he owes his existence to himself....But I live completely by the grace of another if I owe him not only the maintenance of my life, but if he has, morever, created my life - if he is the source of my life. When it is not my own creation, my life has necessarily a source of this kind outside it.[87]

This is an expression of what Kierkegaard refers to as "angst", what Heidegger refers to as "guilt" and what Sartre terms "unfoundedness" - that sense of not standing at the source of your being - of being dependent and unjustified that can lead to either a religious consciousness, as with Kierkegaard, or to despair, as with Sartre.[88]

Marx, however, seeks a different remedy - the identification of the individual with the species man. As he puts it:

> Now it is certainly easy to say to a single individual what Aristotle has already said: You have been begotten by your father and mother; therefore in you the mating of two human beings - a species act of human beings - has produced the human being. You see, therefore, that even physically, man owes his existence to man.[89]

But this linear regression at some point must be replaced by an awareness of the circular movement of our own creation: "You must also hold on to the circular movement sensuously perceptible in that progression, by which man repeats himself in procreation, man thus always remaining the subject".[90]

As individual, I am "species being" man, brought about by man. In this sense the circle is closed, and self-creation established. Marx's species consciousness has its "metaphysical" consolation built in:

> ..for the socialist man the entire so-called history of the world is nothing but the creation of man through human labor, nothing but the emergence of nature for man, so he has the visible, irrefutable proof of his birth through himself, of the process of his creation.[91]

If you look beyond man and nature, to inquire about the genesis of man and nature, "you are abstracting...from man and nature", and the "abstraction from the existence of nature and man has no meaning".[92] This "abstraction",

which, according to Marx, is the habit of alienated consciousness, finds no place in communist society. Species man is concerned only with the creation of himself, his species and his world.

Communist man is indeed his own foundation, or at least the consciousness of himself as a species being defines him as such. He freely creates and chooses himself via objectification, becomes the world through appropriation and owes even his birth to himself. He is not the victim of existential angst for he is unalienated man- he has attained the being of God.

7.0 SARTRE: THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF OBJECTIFICATION AND APPROPRIATION

Thus far we have attempted:

1. to equate the being of the in-itself-for-itself with unalienated man: that being who chooses and founds himself as being.

2. to show that Marx's communist man, as nonalienated man, is an expression of Sartre's in-itself-for-itself.

3. to show specifically what conditions Marx feels will be met in communist society that will allow man to transcend his alienated condition. As we have seen, the transcendence of alienation will involve: 1) man's objectification in the world 2) man's appropriation of the world 3) the identification of the individual with the species, man. Next, we shall juxtapose Sartre's views on these three issues with those of Marx outlined above. As we shall see, it is in deeming all three "impossibilities" that Sartre ontologizes alienation; it is in claiming that the communist state will bring about these conditions that Marx has historicised it.

We have already said that for Sartre, man is the project to capture being. Sartre occasionally referred to this quest for being as the attempt by man "to objectify his being"; that is, he attempts to ground himself by choosing himself as in-it-self, This attempt at objectification can occur in an infinite variety of ways, but for our purposes, I will categorize them in two groups.

The first, (and these we will not be greatly concerned with) are the "bad faith" projects. These are attempts by the individual to deceive himself, to lie to himself about the ambiguous nature of his being, to "freeze" or solidify himself as being either pure transcendence or only facticity - in-itself. Either the self identifies itself with its freedom, i.e., attempts to become a freedom in the mode of being a thing, thereby refusing to claim past deeds and mistakes or 2)the self wholly identifies itself with its facticity, its past mode of being, ignoring the fact that it simultaneously exists as a transcendence, a freedom, and as such, is a being who is free to change himself at any moment.

The second category, while not consisting of explicitly bad faith projects, are none-the-less, failed projects. According to Sartre, the desire for being manifests itself in three "original relations": the desire to do, the desire

to have and the desire to be. It is his discussion of the "desire to do", the individual's attempt at objectivation through productive activity, that closely parallels Marx's views.

Sartre's analysis of the creative process and the motivation behind the creative process is similar to Marx's position. One creates an object, according to Sartre, "to enter into a certain relationship with it".[93] I experience myself as the source of the creation; "It is not enough that a certain picture which I have in mind should exist; it is necessary as well that it exist <u>through me</u>".[94] I encounter the thing created, then, as emanating from me; I stand to it as its own foundation, as the source of its being. It carries "my mark".[95] It is, for an indefinite period of time, "my" thought, but my thought objectified - a thought which "sustains itself alone in being", a thought "active when I'm not actually thinking it".[96] Thus I enter into a double relation with the object: "I stand to it then in the double relation of the consciousness which conceives it and the consciousness which encounters it".[97] But what I hope for is an objectification that is at once myself, yet outside myself. As Sartre puts it: "What I wish precisely is that this in-itself might be a sort of emanation of myself while still remaining in itself."[98] I want to encounter myself as object existing outside myself, or, to

put it in Marxist terms, I want to "contemplate [myself] In a world [I have] created".[99]

As both Sartre and Marx recognize, such an occurence does mend the rift between subject and object. The self becomes world and the world self. If, in fact, objectification of the self can occur, one looks directly to the world to find oneself in it. In effect, there is no self if there is no world upon which the individual can confirm, create and discover himself.

But Sartre is quick to burst this bubble:

> But creation is an evanescent concept which can exist only through its movement. If we stop, it disappears. At the extreme limits of its acceptance, it is annihilated; either I find only my pure subjectivity, or I encounter a naked, indifferent materiality which no longer has any relation to me.[100]

My creation, upon inspection, is alien to me; it is not me but falls away as other.

Thus, in creating, I am actually seeking a more stable relationship with being. I create something in order that I may own it: "One does (=makes) an object in order to enter into a certain relation with it. This new relation can be immediately reducible to having".[101] Created objects, then, "interest me only to the degree that the bond of creation which I establish between it and me gives to me a particular right of ownership over it."[102]

Possession proves a more stable bond, according to Sartre, for several reasons. First, ownership amounts to a perpetual creation of the object. And while Sartre acknowledges that it is a degraded creation, he insists, none-the-less, that ownership involves creation in the sense that the "object possessed is inserted by me into the total form of my environment; its existence is determined by my situation and by its integration in that same situation".[103] In effect, ownership of an object defines and transforms its existence. The individual remains, therefore, the source, in this diluted sense, of the object he owns - he remains at the foundation of himself to the extent that he is that being which he possesses.

Second, Sartre defines possession as the means by which we attempt to "appropriate" objects, i.e., the means by which we attempt to absorb them into ourselves. In fact, Sartre more or less equates possession with appropriation. possession is the synthetic internal relation which "effects the unification of the possessor and the possessed...to possess is to be united with the object possessed in the form of appropriation".[104] In possession I am the "possessor-possessed dyad", a unity of "self and not-self"

Given Sartre's characterization, possession, initially, seems to bring about the the synthesis of the in-itself-for-itself that Sartre claims is man's fundamental project, thereby overcoming man's alienation from world. By making creation a component of possession, the individual stands at the foundation of what he possesses. By equating possession and appropriation the individual fuses with that which he possesses. Possession, then, "is a magical relation; I am these objects which I possess, but outside, so to speak, facing myself; I create them as independent of me, what I possess is mine outside of me..."[105] Thus, concludes Sartre, "I am the foundation for myself in so far as I exist as an indifferent in-itself in relation to myself".[106]

For Sartre, unlike Marx, it is not the creator/created dyad that man seeks in overcoming alienation, it is the bond between possessor and possessed. The creation of an object is merely a transition toward a more stable relationship with the object - that of ownership. Thus the objectification of self through productive activity is ephemeral and delusory, and inevitably gives rise to the project of possession.

But, alas, the project of possession fails as well, and it does so on two grounds. First, to the extent that possession is a creation, it is a failure. An individual's creation, as we have seen, inevitably falls short of becoming himself; the created object does not become the subject but falls from him as alien and wholly independent of him. Second, to the extent that possession is appropriation, it can only be an "ideal" appropriation; "real" appropriation is an impossibility. An individual cannot appropriate anything, that is, take something into its being, without destroying that which it appropriates. Thus a successful appropriation would involve destruction of the in-itself, a consumption. In that case the self would no longer exist at a distance from itself via possession; the in-itself would have collapsed into subjectivity and lost its character as in-itself. If, on the other hand, the object of appropriation is not consumed or wholly assimilated by the for-itself, it, as with creation, falls away from the for-itself as that which the for-itself is not. To "possess" an object, then, is to possess it ideally or symbolically:

> There can be found in it no positive enjoyment outside its symbolic value; it is only the indication of a supreme enjoyment of possession (that of a being who would be its own foundation) which is always beyond all the appropriative conduct meant to realize it.[107]

Consequently, the bond between possessor and possessed is

internal and ontological, but once again negative. My creations or possessions only define me negatively in terms of what I am not. Man's attempt to ground himself, to objectify himself, to bring himself and the world together is, once again, a failure.

In denying the possibility of objectification and non-destructive appropriation, Sartre has left man permanently estranged from the world. And if he cannot objectify himself in being, he remains estranged from himself - a nothingness, a mere flight.

Marx on the other hand, attributes this estrangement to historical circumstances - the capitalist relations of production. Our objects are alien to us only because they are not an accurate reflection of our real powers. We cannot fully appropriate the world because our orientation to the world is distorted and our senses await emancipation. These maladjustments, however, will be overcome in communist society. Who, if either, is correct?

Another way of framing the issue and asking the question is to view both portrayals in their teleological orientation. It is in doing so that we see the striking similarity between these two theories of man, better enabling us to pinpoint precisely what it is that sends the two reeling off in different directions.

For Marx, the individual as well as the society aims at the "establishment of himself [or itself, in the case of society] by practical activity", which is the realization of man's essence.[108] It is in this sense that man's "existence preceeds his essence"; he is born in order to realize his essence, to create and recreate himself in his productive activity. If he is not allowed the free expression of himself through his products, if he is not allowed human "objectification", he exists as unfufilled and alienated. Man's activity as well as the overall social structure, according to Marx, should be guided by this end.

Similarly, Sartre's for-itself arises as the project to be God, that "deep seated structure of human reality" that is rooted in his very ontology.[109] And while Sartre adamantly insists that he has not given a theory of human nature, the nothingness which was to preclude man's essence is, in fact, that which has established it. Man's existence does not precede his essence; they arise simultaneously. But it is the former which determines the latter - it is his quest for being which defines him, fixes him and condemns him to this impossible mission. Sartre's for-itself, like Marx's communist man, acts purposively - in attempts to objectify his being. But Sartre's is a perverse teleology: man aims at an end that is beyond his achievement.

What, then, is the central issue that leads these two philosophers, whose theories, to a large degree, parallel one other, to such different conclusions?

The answer lies in how each characterises "the lack" involved in man's being. As we have seen, both agree that man's alienated condition results from the absence of objective being, or in Sartre's terms, the "in-itself". For Marx, this lack is expressed via "need"; for Sartre, "desire". Sartre, however, interprets man's existence as desire as an indication that he lacks being. "The existence of desires as a human fact is sufficient to prove human reality a lack".[110] This argument, weak as it is, leaves man groping toward the in-itself in attempts to collar and claim it as its own. Given this characterization, that is all man can hope to do.

Marx, on the other hand characaterizes man's lack as "need". But this "need" is multifaceted. As we have seen, it expresses not only the desire for its object, but it expresses an existing power that manifests itself via the need as well. For every need, there is an accompanying power that seeks expression through the need. Need, then, loses its passive character - it is not a complete void in search of fulfillment, but is fraught with potential in the form of power. [111]

"Objectification" for Marx is, then, an expression of being, not a capturing of being. It becomes possible because man exists not as nothingness, but as embodied potentiality. There is no total void to fill, but only needs to satisfy and powers to express and develop. This is not to say that man merely expresses what he was prior to his activity - he is always something more after his interaction with the world than prior to it. Man develops and changes himself as he encounters and changes his world. Objectification is, therefore, both an actualization of potential, and thereby a creation of an actual self visible in objective form.

Also, if Marx's portrayal of need is more accurate than Sartre's characterization of desire, then "doing" does not reduce to "having". That is, if our needs prompt us to actualize our innate capacities, then they ultimately aim at more than their mere fullfillment which, for Sartre, involved "having"; they also aim at the fulfillment of potential that exists in the form of our powers. In fact, if one wanted to take Marx's "homo faber" to extremes, one might conclude that "having" reduced to "doing" - that is, our desire for some "x" is valuable in that it prompts us to develop our appropriative powers. When viewed in this light, having, i.e., the actual procurement of something is secondary to the actual doing - the expression and

actualization of potential.

Finally, if man exists as embodied potentiality rather than lack, his appropriation of the world does not have to express itself as the destructive appropriation of Sartre's for-itself which culminates in the desire for exclusive possession of all with which it comes into contact. If our senses, which have been retarded to a large degree by our less than human world, are really powers of appropriation themselves, then interaction in the form of nondestructive appropriation between man and the world can exist.

The evidence, thus far, favors Marx's position. Clearly Sartre has gone too far in depicting the for-itself as nothingness to the exclusion of the many real powers man exhibits. As Desan points out, one of the more striking paradoxes of Sartre's portrayal of human reality is that"the nothingness of the for-itself is extremely active"[112] And all activity is not in vain. To the extent that it is unalienated activity, it does develop capacities and express (though not exhaustively) what and who a person is.

In reducing "doing" to "having", Sartre has ignored the very real satisfaction that can be gained from activity undertaken for its own sake. Clearly man's preoccupation with "having" which Marx saw as the "sheer estrangement of all...senses", does not have the ontological priority that

Sartre has given it.[113] Ownership, the "immediate, one-sided gratification", which does not serve to develop human capacities is primarily a capitalist preoccupation.[114] An examination of past and present "non-materialist" cultures attests to this. Sartre himself, while initially reducing "doing" to "having", inadvertently asserts the priority of "doing" in defining having as a "continued creation". In effect, his initial claim that "doing" reduces to "having" is negated by his next assertion that "having" actually amounts to a perpetual creation. Thus the "having" becomes valuable only in so far as it is a diluted form of "doing". Because in creating an object, we express and create ourselves, it is the creation of something and not ownership over it that remains fundamental.

It also seems that Marx is correct in claiming that: "Private property has made us so stupid that an object is ours only when we have it- when it is direcly possessed, eaten, drunk, worn inhabited...when it is used by us."[115] This impovershed condition is not the human condition. In Marx's terms, the ear becomes a "human" ear, the eye a "human" eye when it achieves a high state of development. It is only then that man, in his every contact with the world, appropriates the world and develops his powers in doing so. The proof of this interaction, the exchange of

being between man and world need not lie in the destruction of the latter, but can be seen in the development of the former. Even today we see that this type of appropriation, while not prevalent, is possible. An eye, an ear, a palate can be trained to "absorb" more from the world than can an untrained eye, ear, palate, etc. The musician can far better appreciate or in Marxist terms "appropriate" a symphony than can the nonmusician. He literally "gets more" from it than do those whose untrained ears limit their capacity for enjoyment and appropriation.

To this extent, we will agree, that Sartre has mistaken the historical for the ontological subject. It is capitalist man (or man in advanced industrial society, in so far as he has adopted the capitalist sensibility) who asserts the priority of "having" over "doing", who is, for the most part, unable to objectify himself properly in his creative activity. It is capitalist man whose powers remain undeveloped, whose inner emptiness leaves him a void that he seeks to fill through a consumptive and destructive appropriation. It is capitalist man who cannot see himself in a world that he is rapidly destroying.

8.0 SARTRE ON THE OTHER: "ALIENATED MAN"

Sartre's analysis of the Other also precludes the possibility of the identification of the individual with the species, the "conceptual revolution" which would render all "activity and mind, both in their content and in their mode of existence [as] social".[116] As has been stated, "species" consciousness is another means by which communist man establishes himself as source of himself.

In one sense, Sartre's position regarding the Other (as individual or society) is the antithesis of Marx's; social consciousness, i.e., the awareness of my existence with and dependence on others is not the remedy for alienation, but is instead its source. In fact, Sartre first refers to man as "alienated" in his discussion of the Other. (Recall the distinction made in chapter 2 between "man as alienated" and "alienated man". Up to this point, we have been discussing Sartre's depiction of "man as alienated".)

Sartre's dualistic ontology, taken to its logical conclusion, seriously limits the possibilities for intersubjectivity. Consciousness, as a nothingness, is a mere witness to being. It possesses no being of its own, and can confer being upon nothing - it exists simply as the revelation of being. The in-itself, as an absurd plentitude, is simply that which is witnessed. Human

reality is ambiguous, however, in that it is both in-itself and for-itself, though lacking in integration. Any individual has a body and a past, and to this extent he exists as an in-itself, a fixed thing. But an individual is also, at any given moment, much more than his body or his past - he is a transcendence; he surpasses his body toward the world, and transcends his past toward the future. He is a flight, a negation, a ripping away.

Given this structure, there are but two things that can occur when one individual encounters another. The first individual can serve as a witness to the other, deeming him an object in the world, though an object endowed with peculiar characteristics, or he may experience himself as objective, that is as being object for another. The latter experience is made manifest through "the look", the gaze of another. According to Sartre, it is only under the look of another that an individual can realize his "being-for-another", that is his being-as object.

The look, however, is doubly significant: this gaze which reveals my objectness to me also reveals the other as an alien consciousness which has constituted me as this "thing" in the world, this "seen" object. But these two are related, the first constituting the second: to experience myself as an object for another is to simultaneously

experience the other as the alien constituting consciousness. As Sartre puts it:

> I in the recognition of my objective state have proof that he has this consciousness. By virtue of consciousness the Other is for me simultaneously the one who has stolen my being from me and the one who causes 'there to be' a being which is my being.[117]

The recognition accomplished through the other's look is lived in shame, and it is through this shame "that I discover an aspect of my being", the "unjustifiable being-in-itself that I am for the other".[118] I am not for myself, that is apart from the gaze of another, this fixed, transcended being, whose projects can be second guessed and undermined; I am the constituting consciousness, the center of the world, my own project to be. But when looked at, I become aware "that I am vulnerable, that I have a body which can be hurt, that I occupy a place...in short that I am seen."[119]

In light of man's project to be God, such a revelation is indeed embarassing and disturbing. But it is also alienating. My body ceases to be pure "body-for-itself", i.e., my body as lived by me as my orientation to the world. It is now body as object, as seen, as witnessed. Similarly, I am no longer a pure transcendence - the other fixes my transcendence by transcending it. My transcendence "acquires a nature by the sole fact that the Other confers

on it an outside" [120] My projects are second guessed and thereby fixed. And while I am not for myself what I am for the other, I am forced to claim the being which the other has conferred upon me, as alien yet belonging to me.

Since it is the other's consciousness which constitutes me as "being-for-others", a real, yet previously undisclosed facet of my being, Sartre contends that it is he who founds me in this being. Consequently, my project in relation to the other is to unite with him, to join in the founding of my being. This project can take two basic directions.

The first is masochism. The individual attempts to capture the freedom of the Other by making himself the unsurpassable object. This is, from the start, a bad faith project. Any individual is always more than an object, and an inappropriate emphasis on one's "thingness" to the exclusion of that which constitutes him as a transcendence is a deception. But it is also necessarily a failed project. The seducer wants to capture the Other's freedom as freedom. But this would require that the Other freely limit himself to the choice of the seducer - in acutality, a cancellation of his freedom. Thus the Other's freedom qua freedom cannot be caught, and the seducer again becomes aware of the terrible contingency of his being. He cannot be the unsurpassable because it is not he who contstitutes

himself as unsurpassable - it is the other, and the other, as a freedom, can always surpass the seducer towards other ends, rendering the latter inessential or worse yet, a mere instrument.

The other form the project takes is, in its extreme form, sadism. This is an attempt by an individual to not only recover his transcendence but to assimilate the freedom of the Other in doing so. The sadist aims at the capturing of the Other's consciousness not as pure transcendence, but as "the incarnated-Other". This incarnation is attempted through inflicting pain on the Other by the sadist. As Sartre puts it, "in pain facticity invades consciousness", and therefore it is in hopes of creating "a freedom captured by flesh" that the sadist inflicts pain.[121] But sadism is rendered a failed project as well. Incarnation is an impossible achievement; one's freedom cannot be captured through the control of another's body. The victim's freedom remains "on principle out of reach".[122] In the victim's look,

> the sadist experiences the absolute alienation of his being in the Other's freedom; he realizes then not only that he has not recovered his being-outside but also that the activity by which he seeks to recover it is itself transcended and fixed...through and for the Other whom he wishes to enslave.[123]

The above portrayal is pertinent to our analysis because it indicates that the other, again, in the form of the individual or society, is encountered, not as a part of oneself, or that to which the self is in relation as part to a whole, but as other - an alien consciousness in all its alterity. It also indicates that an individual cannot exist with the other in harmony, but only over and against him as "subject" or subservient to him as "object".

Sartre makes this claim, in part, as a refutation of Heidegger's portrayal of man as the "Mitsein", the self as "being with others". Sartre's characterization of Heidegger's Mitsein partially paralells Marx's depiction of "species being". Sartre's critique of the former, therefore, actually involves a critique of the latter. It is with this in mind, that we pursue his analysis of Heidegger.[124]

According to Sartre, Heidegger "substitutes" "being-with-others" for "being-for-others".[125] That is, he replaces the "for-other" relation, i.e., that structure which simeltaneously reveals the self as object and the Other as subject, with a "with-other" relation. The latter "does not intend the reciprocal relation of recognition and conflict which would result from the appearance of a human-reality other than mine in the midst of the

world."[126] It implies "not a frontal opposition but rather an oblique interdependence".[127] In effect, Sartre is claiming that Heidegger's "with-other" relation overlooks the oppositional character of the encounter with the other.

Sartre points to this "oversight" in Heidegger's depiction of both the authentic and inauthentic self. The inauthentic self, the "they self" is that which

> I realize my being-with in the anonymous form of the 'they'...The world refers to me as a sort of impersonal reflection of my unauthentic possibilities in the form of instruments and complexes of instruments which belong to 'everybody' and which belong to me in so far as I am 'everybody'...[128]

Thus I exist inauthentically as "interchangable", as an "anybody". My unique possibilities are absorbed by the "they"; my "being-with" is not "the relation of one unique personality with other personalities equally unique", but as one anonymous being to another.[129] I exist then not as a "me" opposed to a "you"- inauthentic man exists in the "social unity of the they".[130]

Similarly, Heidegger's authentic expression of being-with-others symbolized by a "crew" rowing a boat lacks any reference to the existence of conflict among individuals. In order to "be-with" others authentically,

> I launch out toward death with a resolute-decision (Entschlossenheit) as toward my own most peculiar possibility. At this moment I reveal myself to

> myself in authenticity, and I raise others along with myself toward the authentic.[131]

I realize my unique possibilities not over and against the Other, but with and through him. It is here that Heidegger's analysis parallells Marx's. The intersubjective realm "made manifest to them [the crew] by the common goal to be attained" is where the individual realizes his own peculiar and unique possibilities:

> It is on the common ground of this co-existence that the abrupt revelation of my 'being-unto-death' will suddenly make me stand out in an absolute 'common solitude' while at the same time it raises others to that solitude.[132]

For Marx, of course, it is not the retrieving of one's death that will allow for the authentic expression of individuality, it is free productive activity. But for both Heidegger and Marx, "authentic" or "unalienated" existence involves an awareness of being bound with others on "common ground". The unique individual is not an "I" opposed to a "you", but, according to Sartre, still a part of a "we". Thus, concludes Sartre, Heidegger has failed to account for the existence of conflict in his analysis of authentic existence.

Sartre also faults Heidegger for depicting this "solidarity" as ontological. The Mitsein, according to Heidegger, is an ontological structure of Dasein; it is our way of being in the world. To be in the world is to be in

the world "with-others" (as opposed to Sartre's "for-others"). Sartre takes exception to this view. While he acknowledges that we "encounter certain emperical states of our being...which seem to reveal a co-existence of consciousness rather than a relation of opposition", he insists that "it is precisely this coexistence which must be explained". He asks:

> Why does it [the "being-with" structure] become the unique foundation of our being? Why is it the fundamental type of our relation with others? Why did Heidegger believe that he was authorized to pass from this emperical and ontic establshment of being-with to a position claiming co-existence as the ontological structure of my "being-in-the-world"?[133]

If, in fact, Heidegger's "being-with" structure cannot account for the existence of social conflict, Sartre seems justified in asking these questions.[134] It is unsound to base one's ontology on certain experiences to the exclusion of other conflicting experiences. Sartre, however, having critiqued Heidegger for a one-sided analysis of the social realm, proceeds to commit the same error. But rather than overlooking the existence of conflict in social relations, he focuses on it exclusively, swinging the pendulum too far in the other direction.

Sartre, having already deprived the Mitsein of its ontological status, none-the-less acknowledges that the self can apprehend itself as in unity with other selves in two ways. The first is the experience of the "Us-Object". The basic structure of this phenomenon is the same as the original experience of the other, except that there are more than two individuals involved. A group existing in close proximaty spatially, financially, socially, etc., can be "collectivized" by a third party who "looks" at them, that is transcends their situation and defines them as "clumped together". The third party has objectified these individuals, not as individuals, but as a group. They have become "the poor", "the workers", "the oppressed" by virtue of their situation as it exists in contrast to the alien third. Given Sartre's initial analysis of the relation of self and other, the Us-Object exists bound not by a sense of community, but by a "collective alienation".[135]

The second is the experience of the "We-self", easily translatable into Heidegger's Mitsein or Marx's "Species Being". It is established just as both Heidegger and Marx depict it, through a joint effort to attain a common end. We are bonded "across a material object 'to be created'".[136] We work together to bring about a transition, and become conscious of ourselves as a unity. My end is simultaneously their end; there is one project,

one transcendence - the group. The key to this experience, according to Sartre, is the rythym: My transcendence

> melts into the general rythym of the work or of the march of the concrete community which surrounds me....I do not utilize the collective rythym as an instrument...I do not transcend it toward my possibilities; but I slip my transcendence into its transcendence...[137]

But Sartre is once again quick to dismiss this ray of hope. This latter experience is merely a

> psychological, subjective event in a single consciousness...it does not appear on the foundation of a concrete ontological relation with others and does not realize any Mitsein.[138]

It is, as with man's "bond" with the world, only "symbolic", "a way of feeling myself in the midst of others". [139] It is a "fleeting experience without metaphysical bearing".[140]

At this point Sartre, although failing to mention Marx by name, seems to directly address Marx's position: The "We-Subject" is merely a "psychological experience realized by an historic man immersed in a working universe and in a society of a definite economic type".[141] This renders commuinist man's social bonds merely psychological, and "species" consciousness is left an illusion of sorts. Instead of the communist state being the realization of the human essence, might it not be a grand scheme to mask the most fundamental of all social experiences - conflict?

Clearly, Sartre thinks so. There is never any "my getting out of my self" or others getting out of their selves, but only this illusion brought about by "the material channeling of my transcendence which disposes me to apprehend it as extended and supported by the other transcendences.."[142] The subject/object dualism in Sartre's philosophy is rarely so blatant as here: my subjectivity remains hopelessly hidden and unreachable - it can not be grasped via its "material chanellings" and it is in mistaking one's subjectivity for the latter that the illusion of the "we" comes about.

Sartre's analysis of the other has dashed the final hope - man's project to found his own being through the other has failed. For Sartre, this means that an individual cannot bond with another, cannot absorb or be absorbed by the Other's transcendence which has constitued the former's objectivity. No inidividual, therefore, can join in the founding of himself. For Marx, this would mean that the individual cannot identify himself with his species - he owes his existence and his life to something or someone else. His source of himself remains outside of himself.

Sartre, here, in dismissing the possibility of the "we-self", thereby disallowing Marx's species consciousness, has once again defied his phenomonolgy in favor of his

ontology. When it comes to the experience of the "we", the "experience qua experience" which is at the basis of all phenomonolgical accounts is deemed merely "psychological" or "subjective", as existing only in individual consciousness. The valid phenomonological account, which supposedly is the basis for Sartre's ontology, takes a back seat, and is in fact degraded and stripped of any epistemological let alone ontological status. The experience of the "we" of which Sartre himself has given a splendid phenomonological account is, of course, at odds with Sartre's dualistic ontology and has, therefore, been sacrificed to it.

Also, in addition to demoting the phenomonological, Sartre, in not allowing the "material chanelling" of transcendence to account or express the actual acting subject, has killed any possibility of intersubjectivity. If my subjectivity cannot be expressed in my object nor even in my activity, then there is no way the other can know me, let alone exist in some sort of union with me.

Sartre, then, has given evidence of possibilities or expressions of intersubjectivity but has immediately discounted them. Man is permanently isolated from man, just as he is permanently isolated from his world. "The essence of relations between consciousnesses is not the Mitsein; it is conflict".[143] Sartre's metaphysics once again reigns.

9.0 CONCLUSION

The critical focus of this paper thus far has been on Sartre. He has been found guilty of ontologizing what seems to be alterable circumstances and has left the individual permanently isolated from his world and from his fellow man. For Sartre, there can be no unity between man and world nor man and man short of total assimilation, no internal relationships uniting them except for the negative bonds whereby the for-itself acquires its identity via what it is not. If, in fact, this were the only type of bond man had with the world and with the Other, then the more familiar one became with a place, the more apart he would feel from it - the more time he spent in the company of others, the more isolated he would feel from them. This is indeed contrary to experience. Given the proper circumstances, we begin to feel ourselves an integral part of our surroundings. This sort of unity establishes identity, it does not invalidate it.

While Sartre's phenomonological descriptions have verified this unity, his ontology has disallowed it. Sartre has given vivid descriptions of 1) the encounter of the self in the "created object" and 2) the experience of a "mutual transcendence" that can occur in the joint project. Both experiences were found lacking any ontological foundation,

and consequently, were rendered "illusory" and "symbolic". If Sartre's ontology were really derived from his phenomonolgy, it would have to account for the experience of unity as well as that of conflict. Thus, as a phenomonological ontology, Being and Nothingness remains seriously flawed.

But if it can be said that Sartre goes too far in one direction, it must be said that Marx goes too far in the other. If Marx's characterization of man is correct, if man's historical and continually developing needs are always accompanied by an appropriating power available to fulfill them, then the possibility of man completely transcending his alienated condition is realistic, given the proper historical circumstances. If man is really only an embodied potential awaiting actualization in and through the world, then all hope is far from lost. But if not, if man actually has needs and desires that he is powerless to meet, then it must be said that Marx has historicized, to some extent, an ontological condition - he awaits a day that even the "positive transcendence" of private property cannot overcome.

It seems the latter is the case. As the comparison of the above two positions has shown, Marx's portrayal of communist man is a clear cut exemplification of man's desire

for the founding of his being, the theme that has run throughout Being and Nothingness. Since Marx has allowed for the identification of the individual with his species, the founding of being has become a social project; whereas for Sartre, for whom the self is privatized and "atomized", it is an individual project. Clearly the joint effort makes the task more plausible, but is it enough?

To the extent that man develops himself in his unalienated productive activity and to the extent that his object serves as an objectification of himself, man has created himself. And to the extent that men live together in a sense of community, that is, in as much as the individual is an individual only as a species being and as such, "is just as much the totality", man stands at the source of himself.[144] But is that enough? Will the "gift" Marxist man wishes to take back from God, i.e., man's "potential for achievement" leave him with the sense of control and security he seeks?[145] Will he really become that "social being who in cooperation with his fellows rules over nature" and creates himself?[146]

It seems unlikely. The "taking up, supersceding and revolutionizing pre-established immediate facticity" that Marcuse has claimed is communist man's project is always incomplete and, to some extent, failed.[147] We change the

world, but the world gets away from us once again somehow. In curing one type of cancer, we give a man another type. In solving the problem of scarcity, we have polluted our world. In attempting to help the poor, we manage somehow to further degrade them. These "disasters" are of course historically contingent; we can imagine a more advanced agro-biology and an improved social services system which might remedy these ills. But it is precisely because all projects do take place in history that they so often take an unforseen course. That is, we cannot, in principle, forsee all the effects any particualar action may bring about. We do not have, nor can we forsee having, the grasp on the world that Marx envisioned us having. The naive hope to the contrary, born of the enlightenment mentality, has wrought unprecedented destruction. In attempting to "control" his world, man has succeeded in destroying much of it.

This is not to say that all projects take this perverse twist- man has made real progress in many areas. Even "failed" projects can be successful in bringing men together, thereby creating bonds where none existed before. Man's labors are by no means totally futile or without reward. But facticity evades us - our attempts to usurp it, transform it, often backfire, and while we are far from helpless in this world, we can never gain the control, the sense of oneness with the world or with one another that

Marx hoped for.

But this does not mean that our efforts will be wholly ineffective against the layering of alienation that is not ontological; nor does it mean that we must not try to achieve a greater unity among men and between man and world. In fact, Sartre argues that it is just our nature to do so. The groundedness, justification and self-control i.e., the being of man as the desire for the in-itself-for-itself, is not without consequence: It is the carrot which dangles from the stick attached to the donkey's yoke - it is that which propells us forward, yet that which we can never attain; it is at once our frustration and our motivation.

Sartre, then, must be given his due. While his analysis is unbalanced, his focus on the element of failure in the human quest for "totality" tempers the enlightenment mentality (which has brought about more than a few "advances" reeking of failure and destruction) without leaving man paralyzed. Sartrean man acts not in defiance of God, but in hopes to become God. He falls short of his vision, of course, but his failures are often fruitful (he creates and he loves, if only momentarily) and his quest continues. In man's failure to become God he becomes human - and, as the Ancient Greeks recognized, there is inevitably a hint of tragedy in his condition. Man was born to "outdo"

himself - this is both the bulk of Sartre's message and the crux of Marx's project, neither of which should be wholly abandoned.

10.0 NOTES

1. Raymond Aron, Marxism and Existentialism (New York, 1970), p. 37.

2. By "God", here, I am referring only to Sartre's conception of God. There are undoubtedly richer and more complex conceptions that far surpass what Marx expects Communist man to attain.

3. This paper deals exclusively with Marx's The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and Sartre's Being and Nothingness. Reference to Sartre's specifically Marxist work, The Critique of Dialectical Reason, has been omitted for the following reasons: 1) It remains philosophically less interesting as an analysis of alienation. 2) Sartre's views in this latter work have not changed substantially from those presented in Being and Nothingness. He is still unable to find grounds from more than fleeting moments of intersubjectivity; genuine camaraderie comes about during the "storming" of the barricades, after which social relations become refied and enforced. Also, he still focuses on the element of failure in human projects. He coins the term "practico-inert" to refer to the unforseen factors which alienate men from their intended ends.

4. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York, 1956), p. 24.

5. Klaus Hartmann, Sartre's Ontology (Evanston, 1966) p. 35.

6. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York, 1956), pp. 32-34.

7. Just how or why this takes place Sartre never makes clear.

8. Sartre, p. 81.

9. Ibid., p. 82.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., p. 4.

12. Ibid., p. 23.

13. Ibid.

14. "Negatite" is a term coined by Sartre to refer to those experiences which reflect the negating power of consciousness.

15. Sartre, p. 127.

16. Ibid., p. 74.

17. Ibid., p. 87.

18. Ibid., p. 24.

19. By "facticity" Sartre means all that we encounter that cannot be chosen by us. This includes the many particulars of our situation: our sex, our race, birthplace, physique, etc. Our past becomes facticity, not because we have not at one time chosen it, but because once posited as "past", it can no longer be chosen. That is, we cannot undo it or choose a different past, just as we cannot choose to be born elsewhere. Past qua past takes on the dead character of the in-itself.

20. Sartre, p. 121.

21. Ibid., p. 126.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p. 439.

24. Ibid., p. 89.

25. Ibid., p. 350.

26. Ibid., p. 560.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., p. 90.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., p. 566.

31. Ibid., p. 79.

32. Ibid., p. 80.

33. Ibid., p. 575.

34. Ibid., p. 566.

35. Ibid., p. 597.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., p. 84.

38. Ibid., p. 598.

39. Ibid., p. 87.

40. Ibid., p. 90.

41. Ibid., p. 615.

42. Bertell Ollman, Alienation (Cambridge, 1971), p. 110.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., p. 137.

45. Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (New York, 1965), p. 113.

46. Ibid., p. 108.

47. Ibid.

48. Ollman, p. 95.

49. Marx, p. 113.

50. Herbert Marcuse, "The Foundations of Historical Materialism" in Negations (Boston, 1968), p. 13.

51. Marx, p. 112.

52. Ibid., p. 107.

53. Ibid., p. 108.

54. Ibid., p. 110.

55. Ollman, p. 137.

56. For Marx, all labor, alienated or otherwise, results in objectification. That is, all man's interactions with the world express, to some extent, his powers. But when man's labor is coerced, when he is forced to do menial and tedious labor, his expression is inhibited and the resulting objectification is distorted.

57. Marx, p. 175.

58. Ibid., p. 110.

59. Ollman,, p. 145.

60. Ibid., p. 147.

61. Ibid., p. 203.

62. Ibid., p. 150.

63. Marx, p. 135.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid, p. 133.

66. Marcuse, p. 32.

67. This analysis presupposes that man, in the absence of coersion, is free, that he is not a wholly determined being. Marx, while commenting only briefly on the possibility of free choice, establishes this autonomy much the same way Sartre does: He claims that man's life "is an object for him. Only because of this is his activity free activity". (Marx, p. 133) It is, as with Sartre, man's "presence" to himself and to his world that allows for the possibility of free choice. For Marx, however, this consciousness of self and world directs our engagement with the world; for Sartre, it is directly responsible for our disengagement.

68. Ollman, p. 101.

69. Marx felt that the promise of technology layed in its potential to liberate man from tiresome and tedious labor. He foresaw a nearly fully automated production

system which would require very little maintenance and supervision. To the extent that enervating work would be required, it would be shared among members of the community.

70. While Marx speaks of alienated labor as if it were an "all or nothing" affair, it is obvious that there are degrees of alienated labor. For example, even in a capitalistic society, a painter or a novelist is expressing and developing himself in his work far more than a factory worker. If, however, his artistic activity is also his livlihood, then alienation seeps in. If he is forced by his financial circumstances to "create" that which will sell, then his own tastes and inclinations may very well be overriden by market demands. Even if he is independently wealthy, and creates "freely" in this sense, he is immersed in an alienated society and therefore inevitably suffers alienated relations with his fellow man. Thus, while he may be in some respects more fortunate than those doing menial labor, Marx would still characterize him as "alienated". His product, then, will somehow reflect that alienation.

71. Marx, p. 139.

72. Ibid., p. 138.

73. Istvan Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation (New York, 1970), p. 202-203.

74. Ollman, p. 90.

75. Ibid., p. 89.

76. Ibid., p. 91.

77. Ibid., p. 93.

78. Ibid., pp. 107-108.

79. Marcuse, p. 34.

80. Marx, p. 137.

81. Meszaros, p. 258.

82. Ollman, p. 105.

83. Ibid., p. 106.

84. Ibid.

85. Marx, p. 140.

86. Ibid., p. 141.

87. Ibid., p. 144.

88. There are, however, other alternatives. Camus, for example, gives us the "absurd man" who takes neither of these routes.

89. Marx, p. 144.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid., p. 145.

92. Ibid.

93. Sartre, p. 576.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid., p. 577.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid., p. 582.

99. Marx, p. 114.

100. Sartre, p. 591.

101. Ibid., p. 576. In the original French edition Sartre uses the verb "faire", translatable as "to make" or "to do".

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid., p. 590.

104. Ibid., p. 588.

105. Ibid., p. 591.

106. Ibid., p. 592.

107. Ibid., p. 593.

108. Meszaros, p. 118.

109. Sartre, p. 581.

110. Ibid., p. 87.

111. In the Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre, in attempting to allign himself with Marx, allows "need" (not "lack") to drive his dialectic. This "need", however, unlike Marx's, retains its passive character, as Sartre fails to emphasize the "powers" which seek expression through man's need.

112. Wilfrid Desan, The Tragic Finale (New York, 1960), p. 55.

113. Marx, p. 139.

114. Ibid., p. 138.

115. Ibid., p. 139.

116. Ibid., p. 137.

117. Sartre. p. 364.

118. Ibid., p. 221.

119. Ibid., p. 259.

120. Ibid., p. 262.

121. Ibid., p. 399.

122. Ibid., p. 405.

123. Ibid.

124. It should be emphasized that this is Sartre's interpretation of Heidegger. Another reading may find Heidegger far more concerned with the individual qua individual than has Sartre.

125. Sartre, p. 247.

126. Ibid., p. 245.

127. Ibid., p. 246.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid.

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid., p. 247.

133. Ibid.

134. This is a debatable issue, but since it is not Heidegger's analysis of the social realm, but Sartre's reaction to Heidegger's analysis that interests us here, the issue will remain unexplored.

135. Sartre, p. 421.

136. Ibid., p. 419.

137. Ibid., p. 425.

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid.

140. Ibid., p. 429.

141. Ibid.

142. Ibid., p. 425.

143. Ibid., p. 429.

144. Marx, p. 138.

145. Ollman, p. 223.

146. Ibid.

147. Marcuse, p. 47.

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